

Belief is the conceptual (intelligible, logical) structure of a world given **only** in or as profiles (adumbrations.) To say that a statement is true is *primarily* to simply make the same assertion (see the “prosentential” approach to this issue.) Belief is the “meaningstructure” of the world from a point of view.

I can talk about color and sound, but the concepts I use are not color or sound (even if in fact communication involves color and sound). The world can be thought of as given through various channels. Coltrane can “say” with his saxophone what ink letters on the page cannot say. A good photograph can “tell” someone what Mr. X looks like more efficiently than a string of sentences. But all the points made in this paragraph themselves exist within the elusive channel of conceptuality, which is also a “virtual” and yet “central” space of reasons. The slippery essence of this conceptual space is metaphoricity.

How do ideas connect to the world? This is a pseudoproblem created by the unjustified assumption that the world is dead “stuff-in-itself.” The real world has always been what phenomenology calls the “lifeworld.” The term “lifeworld” was only necessary in a context of a confusion which is laughable in retrospect. Somehow philosophers hid the world from themselves, and the untutored masses were wiser than them, at least on this particular issue. Indirect realism takes realism for granted without realizing it. It does this by trusting the reports of the sense organs about themselves as *direct* reports, which can then be used to make everything else mere representation.

Let us return to the concept of belief again. To live in the lifeworld with others is to live *immediately* in conceptuality, meaningfulness, significance. I see that-the-mail-hasn't-come-yet. I “read off” concept or meaningstructure from experience “automatically.” The world is always already meaningfully structured for me. Heidegger’s idea of the equipmental nexus is helpful here. Husserl’s signitive and fulfilled intentions are also helpful. With the box closed, I guess that it contains a book. This is an empty intention. I “picture” a book in the box. Then the box is opened, and I see a book. Now my intention is fulfilled. A “potential meaningstructure” “matched” an “actual meaningstructure”. I use quotes because the terminology is only a tentative tool for

communicating concepts.

Dualism is avoided if we “empty” the subject. Consciousness is “just” the being of our shared world which is only given perspectively (in profiles, in terms of actual and possible perceptions.) So consciousness is the being of “the-world-from-a-point-of-view.” Traditionally “mental” entities are still public rather than private in the sense of belonging in the public space of reasons. We understand that “you” have a different kind of access to “your” toothache.

But we also understand why and that “one” calls the dentist when “one” has a toothache. This “inferential role” approach to entities gives us a kind of radical pluralism. The world-from-a-point-of-view includes toothaches and forks and promises. The philosopher as such takes only reasoning itself, and what makes that possible in its blurriness, as fundamental. The work of Robert Brandom is especially valuable here. Philosophers tend to treat their own rationality as if it were not necessarily at the center of the world. They know not what they do, in a way that hobbles their ontological inquiries.

All these beliefs together might be understood as a “rationalist” pluralistic phenomenological perspectivism.